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Abstract 
This paper surveys the literature examining securitization. Besides describing the economic motivation for the use of 
securitization, the paper provides details on securitization characteristics and players, presents the recent trends of 
securitization markets, describes the role played by securitization in the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and compares the 
financial characteristics of securitization transactions for a large cross-section of ABS, MBS and CDO tranches issued 
during the 2000-2011 period. Securitization creates value by increasing liquidity, reducing the cost of funding, 
allowing originators to diversify funding sources, improving originators’ risk management, and allowing originators to 
benefit from regulatory arbitrage and to improve key financial ratios. However, securitization transactions are complex 
undertakings, they are expensive to set up, and increase the deadweight transaction costs associated with principal-
agent and asymmetric information problems when used inappropriately. 
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Introduction© 
Securitization is an economically significant 
financial market segment, worthy of empirical 
analysis in its own right. According to the 
Association for Financial Markets (see 5.2), the 
volume of securitized assets in Western Europe 
grew from €78.2 billion in 2000 to €753.9 billion in 
2008, an increase of 864.1%, followed by a sharp 
decrease after 2008. In 2014, a total of €199.0 
billion of securitized products were issued in 
Western Europe, a decline of 73.6% from 2008. 
The interest of studying securitization is also 
justified by the puzzling role of securitization. There 
is a broad consensus concerning the important role 
played by securitization in the development and 
propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis (IMF, 
2008a and 2008b; Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009; 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Keys et al., 2010; Demyanyk 
and Van Hemert, 2011; Purnanandam, 2011). 
Additionally, several authors argue that 
securitization may have lowered the impact of 
monetary policy, because banks derive more of their 
funding from capital markets (Estrella, 2002; 
Kuttner, 2002; Goswami et al., 2009; Loutskina and 
Strahan, 2009; Loutskina, 2011). However, recent 
studies have pointed out that securitization played a 
relevant role in allowing financial institutions to 
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solve liquidity and funding problems in the post-
crisis period, namely as an active tool to access 
various lending schemes by central banks (Altunbas 
et al., 2009; Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010; Krebsz, 
2011). As a result, there is an increased need to 
understand what securitization transactions are, 
the motivations behind them, their benefits, 
features and problems. 
The term securitization is used to represent the 
process whereby financial assets are pooled 
together, with their cash flows, and converted into 
negotiable securities to be placed in the market; i.e., 
it is a technique used to transform illiquid assets into 
securities. As asserted by Fabozzi et al. (2006), 
securitization ‘refers to the sale of assets, which 
generate cash flows, from the entity that owns them 
to another entity that has been specially set up for 
the purpose, and the issuing of notes by this second 
entity’1. Securitization is thus a structured finance 
technique that allows credit to be provided directly 
through market processes rather than through 
financial intermediaries – the so-called financial 
disintermediation. 
The key element of securitization is that the obligation 
of the issuer to repay investors is backed by the value 
of a pool of financial assets or credit support provided 
by a third party to the transaction. The markets for the 
securities issued through securitization are composed 
of three main classes (Blum and DiAngelo, 1997; 
Choudhry and Fabozzi, 2004): asset-backed securities 
(ABS), backed by consumer-backed products; 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), backed by 
mortgages; and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), 
backed by debt obligations. 
                                                     
1  For further details see, e.g., Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and 
Fabozzi (2003), Tavakoli (2008), Tasca and Zambelli (2005), Kothari 
(2006), Jobst (2007), Krebsz (2011), Gorton and Metrick (2013), and 
references therein. 
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To understand the relevance of securitization, we 
are taken back to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
capital structure irrelevance theorem. In a 
Modigliani and Miller world, securitization 
transactions would not exist, as they would offer no 
advantages over less costly alternatives; i.e., in a world 
of perfect and liquid financial markets, where 
asymmetric information is not an issue, tranching or 
the act of encapsulating a pool of assets in an ad hoc 
organization would not add value and a firm’s 
financing structure would be irrelevant. Thus, the 
existence of market imperfections, including 
asymmetric information, agency conflicts, and market 
incompleteness can explain tranching, ‘off-balance 
sheet financing,’ and the benefits of securitization 
instruments. Consequently, securitization may matter, 
because it creates value by minimizing the net costs 
associated with the stated market imperfections. 
Despite the previously mentioned economic benefits 
for sponsors and investors, securitization also has 
disadvantages, namely: (1) complexity; (2) off-balance 
sheet treatment; (3) asymmetric information problems; 
(4) agency problems; and (5) higher transaction costs. 
Besides the fact that securitization instruments are 
complex vis-à-vis straight debt finance products, 
problems (3) and (4) are commonly pointed out, 
underlying the roots of the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
(Calomiris, 2009; Jobst, 2009; Gorton, 2009; 
McConnell and Buser, 2011; Purnanandam, 2011). 
Our paper sheds some light on the puzzling role of 
securitization. In addition, to our knowledge, no 
 
full-scale survey of securitization literature has yet 
been published, namely studying the 
interconnection between the 2007-2008 crisis and 
the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis and 
securitization transactions. We also describe the 
issues that future researches should address to 
better understand the impact of securitization on 
banks’ liquidity and funding costs, as well as the 
role of the European Central Bank (ECB) ABS 
purchase program on asset prices and longer-term 
private borrowing rates. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Sections 1 and 2 describe the typical securitization 
transaction scheme and main instruments, 
respectively. The economic motivations and 
problems of securitization are presented in section 3. 
Section 4 discusses the role of securitization in the 
2007-2008 financial crisis. Section 5 compares the 
financial characteristics of ABS, MBS and CDO 
tranches and presents the recent trends of Western 
European securitization markets. The final section 
presents our conclusions. 
1. The typical securitization transaction scheme 
A securitization transaction is implemented through 
a transfer of assets from the originator to a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV), which then issues securities, 
in the form of debt instruments, to be placed in the 
market through a private or public offering2. Figure 
1 presents a representation of the financial flows in 
a typical securitization transaction3. 
 
Note: Adapted from Roever and Fabozzi (2003) and Tasca and Zambelli (2005). 
Fig. 1. Financial flows in a securitization transaction 
There are two basic deals involved: (1) the asset 
sale; and (2) the issuance of securities. For example, 
if a bank intends to raise money by selling a specific 
pool of mortgages through securitization, the 
financial flows would be: (1) the bank (originator) 
sells the assets to a separate entity, the SPV; (2) the 
SPV transforms them into negotiable securities to be 
placed into the capital market; (3) the issuance of 
securities backed by the acquired assets in order to 
finance the asset purchase; and (4) the cash flows 
originated by the acquired pool of assets are then 
used to pay the principal and interest of the 
securities to the final investors.   4  
                                                     
2 It can be presented the following issuers of asset-backed securities: (1) 
captive finance companies of manufacturing firms that provide 
financing only for their parent company’s products; (2) financing 
subsidiaries of major industrial corporations; (3) independent finance 
companies; and (4) domestic and foreign commercial banks. 
3 By typical we mean a cash flow based or funded securitization. 
Securitization can also be implemented based on a synthetic structure. 
See section 2 for further analysis of funded securitizations versus 
synthetic securitization. 
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The standard structure for securitization in Europe is 
somewhat different from the US, where trusts play 
an important role. They own assets such as 
mortgage loans and investors have a direct 
ownership interest in the trust. In Europe, all deals 
use a variant of the following structure: (1) the 
originator sells the assets to an SPV; and (2) the 
SPV then issues a bond, which is purchased by 
various investors, backed by the assets owned by 
the SPV. This vehicle company is usually a 
company subject to corporate law, but restricted in 
activity, and may be exempted from certain taxes. 
However, in any part of the world, the securitization 
 
process involves a standard number of analyses 
prior to the issuance of securities, namely: (1) 
assessing the collateral; (2) modeling cash flows; (3) 
quantifying risk factors via stress tests or other 
techniques; and (4) structuring the transaction, 
bearing several factors in mind, such as the client’s 
specifications, the type of assets, the rating 
agencies’ opinion, the availability of data, and the 
investor’s interest in the deal. 
In order to understand the whole securitization 
process, Figure 2 describes the major steps in a 
typical securitization transaction.  
 
Fig. 2. Basic securitization process 
In more detail, Step 1: the originator identifies a 
pool of assets (receivables) that can5be securitized4; 
Step 2: the pool of assets is transferred to an SPV at 
par value and based on a true sale transaction; Step 
3: the SPV holds the asset pool, paying for it by 
issuing securities; Step 4: securities are structured 
into different classes and offered to capital markets, 
which are usually purchased by banks, insurance 
companies, pension funds and other institutional 
investors; Step 5: payment of the asset purchase; 
and Step 6: the originator – who has proximity with 
the borrowers and typically has an infrastructure and 
systems in place for doing so – collects cash flows 
related to the assets, i.e., retains the servicing function. 
The highest rating for Class A (the most senior 
class) is explained by two factors: (1) the assets’ 
segregation from bankruptcy risks of the originator; 
and (2) the implementation of different credit 
enhancement strategies. One strategy is the creation 
of a credit risk mitigation device by subordination of 
 
                                                     
4 The originator typically identifies assets with similar characteristics. 
Theoretically, any asset producing regular cash flows can be securitized. 
Classes B, C, D, …, such that those lower classes 
provide credit support to Class A. Often the size of 
classes B and C is determined in order to meet the 
rating objective for Class A. Likewise, the size of 
Class C is settled in order to meet the desired rating 
for Class B. In other words, the entire transaction is 
structured to meet specific investor needs.6 
Additional credit enhancement mechanisms may be 
necessary to improve the credit rating of the issued 
securities and reduce the risks transferred to 
investors5. These mechanisms can be either 
internally determined or externally provided. 
External credit enhancement mechanisms are 
provided by third-party guarantees, providing first-
loss protection against losses up to a certain amount. 
Examples are: (1) guarantees; (2) letters of credit; 
and (3) bond insurance. This kind of guarantee can 
either apply to all the issued tranches or, more 
typically, only to one particular tranche. Internal credit 
enhancement mechanisms are: (1) subordination; 
                                                     
5 See, for example, Roever and Fabozzi (2003) and Fabozzi and Kothari 
(2007) for an indepth description of internal and external credit 
enhancement mechanisms. 
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(2)7overcollateralization6; (3) cash reserve accounts; 
(4) excess spread7; (5) trigger events; and (6) 
minimum debt or interest service coverage levels. 
The type and amount of credit enhancement 
employed in a transaction represents the matching 
point of the issuer’s need to maximize deal proceeds 
and the rating agencies’ judgment with respect to 
how much credit enhancement is required to achieve 
the desired rating on the senior bond classes 
(Fabozzi et al., 2006). One important difference 
between the approach used to rate securitized debt 
and bonds is that corporate obligations are rated ex 
post while securitized products are rated ex ante. 
Securitization transactions are thus structured by 
issuing securities aiming at a specific rating profile 
(Roever and Fabozzi, 2003).  
Regarding the securitization’s financing structure, 
there are two essential characteristics. The first 
concerns the SPV, which represents a critical player 
within the process. Secondly, the transaction is 
realized through a ‘true sale’ of assets by the 
originator to the SPV, which allows the isolation of 
a group of financial assets, separating their risk from 
the firm8. Therefore, the expected return to investors 
relies mainly on the risk of the cash flows 
guaranteed by the pool of assets, rather than the 
default risk of the originator. The SPV role is 
paramount and provides an investor with greater 
protection. With the separate incorporation of the 
SPV the assets are no longer available to the 
originator or its creditors. Although the remoteness 
from bankruptcy may be achieved ensuring 
independence of the SPV from the originator, in 
practice this has been thrown somewhat into doubt 
during the credit crisis as the true sale status has 
been challenged in some federal courts in the US. 
Originators need to carefully ensure that the assets 
transferred to the SPV are ring-fenced from further 
originator interaction and have to analyze cautiously 
if any structural feature of the transaction may 
threaten the true sale claim. 
2. Securitization structures 
Securitization can be implemented in two ways: (1) a 
true sale (or cash flow based or funded) securitization 
– the underlying assets are sold by the originator to 
the SPV and removed from its balance sheet; or (2) a 
 
                                                     
6 The overlying bonds are lower in value compared to the underlying 
asset pool: for example, €250 million nominal of assets are used as 
backing for €200 million nominal of issued bonds. 
7 The excess spread results from the positive difference between cash 
inflows from assets and the interest service requirements of liabilities, 
and it acts as the first line of credit support for the deal. 
8 Contrary to the US, in Europe, in many jurisdictions (e.g., Germanic type 
of law), there is a sale or assignment of the assets to an SPV but the 
perfection of the sale is often postponed until various trigger events occur in 
order to avoid complicated borrower notification laws. See Davidson et al. 
(2003) for further discussion of European securitization legislation. 
synthetic securitization – the underlying assets remain 
on the balance sheet of the originator, and only the risk 
of the underlying assets is transferred to the SPV by 
buying credit derivatives such as CDS over these 
assets (Tasca and Zambelli, 2005). As in synthetic 
securitization there is no sale of assets, the 
originator does not receive any cash flow and the 
SPV is not the owner of the pool of assets, but rather 
the entity carrying the associated credit risk. 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the main 
securitization instruments. Funded securitizations 
include three main categories: (1) MBS; (2) ABS; and 
(3) CDO9. In practice, CDO can be classified either as 
funded securitization, synthetic securitization or a 
hybrid form incorporating elements of both10.  
Given the important role played by CDO in the 
2007-2008 financial turmoil, we carried out a more 
detailed analysis of such structures. CDO, first 
introduced in 1988, are a type of securitization in 
which an SPV issues bonds or notes backed by debt 
obligations such as investment-grade and high-yield 
corporate bonds, emerging market bonds, MBS, 
ABS, bank loans, special-situation loans and 
distressed debt, and other CDO. A specific type of 
CDO are the Multisector CDO, also known as ABS 
CDO, ABS of ABS, CDO squared, or CDO cubed. 
Multisector CDO emerged in 1999 as a response to 
investors’ desire to securitize their own positions of 
structured product, with the implementation of both 
balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet arbitrage deals. 
These products are very complex, nearly impossible 
for sophisticated investors to fairly value, and 
played an important role in the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis – CDO based on MBS linked to the subprime 
market were negatively affected inflicting enormous 
losses on investors. For example, in a Multisector 
CDO including subprime collateral, one can find 
subprime mortgage loans, subprime auto loans, credit 
card receivables, and mezzanine tranches of CDO. 
3. The economic motivations and problems  
of securitization 
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital structure 
irrelevance theorem holds that capital structure is 
irrelevant to firm value. In such an economy, 
securitization would not exist as it would offer no 
advantages over less costly alternatives. Considering 
that in the real world there are a plethora of different 
capital structures, securitization can strongly affect the 
value of the firm. 
                                                     
9 See, among others, Jobst (2003, 2006b) and Vink and Thibeault (2008) 
for further discussion. Criado and Rixtel (2008) present a description of 
each type of securitization instrument. 
10 See, among others, Fabozzi et al. (2006), Lancaster et al. (2008) and 
Tavakoli (2008) for further discussion of CDO deals, namely 
concerning the difference between cash flow structures and synthetic 
securitization vehicles. 
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Fig. 3. Securitization instruments 
According to Hill (1996), securitization can help to 
reduce real-world costs, like regulatory costs and 
information costs. Reduction of information costs is 
aggravated for firms facing severe ‘lemons 
problems’ (Akerlof, 1970). Hill (1996) argues that 
securitization offers a low cost and credible way for 
information about the firm’s receivables to be accessed 
by investors. Similarly, Iacobucci and Winter (2005) 
state that ‘asset securitization is driven by the 
propensity of the market to allocate assets to investors, 
who are best informed about asset values.’ 
The rationale for the emergence of securitization 
transactions should be found in the economic 
advantages of (1) increasing liquidity and funding 
(Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; Pavel and Phillis, 
1987; Hess and Smith, 1988; Roever and Fabozzi, 
2003; Jobst, 2006a; Krebsz, 2011; Casu et al., 2013)11; 
(2) reducing the cost of funding (Goldberg and Rogers, 
1988; Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988; Davidson et al., 
2003; Roever and Fabozzi, 2003; Calomiris and 
Mason, 2004; Fabozzi et al., 2006; Jost, 2006a; 
Fabozzi and Kothari,122007)12; (3) allowing originators 
to diversify funding sources (Jones, 2000; Davidson 
et al., 2003; Roever and Fabozzi, 2003; Fabozzi and 
Kothari, 2007; Krebsz, 2011); (4) improving 
                                                     
11 Roever and Fabozzi (2003) and Jobst (2006a) refer to securitization as 
a reliable and relatively unconstrained source of off-balance sheet 
financing that mitigates traditional funding constrains and can promote 
a firm’s growth. 
12  Indirect evidence is provided by Nadauld and Weisbach (2012), 
which find that a loan that is subsequently securitized has a lower yield 
than an otherwise identical loan. 
originators’ risk – credit, interest rate, and 
prepayment risks – management (Cumming, 1987; 
Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; Pavel and Phillis, 
1987; Hess and Smith, 1988; Goldberg and Rogers, 
1988; Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988; Davidson et 
al., 2003; Jobst, 2006a; Fabozzi and Kothari, 2007); 
(5) increasing the segmentation between the 
origination and investment functions (Davidson et 
al., 2003); (6) allowing originators to benefit from 
regulatory and/or tax arbitrage (Cumming, 1987; 
Jones, 2000; Davidson et al., 2003; Krebsz, 2011)13; 
and (7) allowing originators to improve key 
financial ratios (Goldberg and Rogers, 1988; Roever 
and Fabozzi, 2003; Fabozzi and Kothari, 2007; 
Krebsz, 2011). 
The main motivations for securitization can be 
analyzed from both the perspectives of a non-bank 
or a bank corporation. According to Fabozzi et al. 
(2006), the principal reasons a non-bank corporation 
may elect to issue an ABS are: (1) to reduce funding 
costs; (2) to diversify funding sources; and (3) to 
accelerate earnings for financial reporting purposes. 
Similarly, Lupica (1998) presents the following 
motivations: (1) improving liquidity; (2) increasing 
diversification of funding sources; (3) lowering the 
effective interest rate; (4) improving risk 
management; and (5) achieving accounting-related 
                                                     
13  Basel II and Basel III are major economic drivers of new 
securitization transactions, because the applicable calculation rules (e.g., 
standardized approach vs internal ratings-based approach vs advanced 
ratings-based approach) highly influence the regulatory capital charge. 
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advantages. For bank corporations, the motivations 
are: (1) new sources of funding (Goldberg and 
Rogers, 1988; Jones, 2000; Fabozzi et al., 2006; 
Loutskina and Strahan, 2009; Cardone-Riportella et 
al., 2010); (2) risk management and the transfer of 
credit risk, to fund risky financial assets and 
minimize financial distress costs (Goldberg and 
Rogers, 1988; Fabozzi et al., 2006; Jobst, 2006a; 
Cardone-Riportella et al., 2010; Chiesa, 2008); (3) 
new profit opportunities, by recognizing accounting 
gains when the market value of loans exceed their 
book value (Flannery, 1989; DeMarzo, 2005; 
Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010); and (4) the 
adjustment of capital ratios (Donahoo and Shaffer, 
1991; Berger and Udell, 1993; Berger et al., 1995; 
Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995; Jagtiani et al., 1995; 
Jones, 2000; Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Ambrose 
et al., 2005; Fabozzi et al., 2006). 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) also present the benefits of 
securitization from an investors’ perspective. 
Securitization allows investors to diversify sector 
interest, access different risk-reward profiles, and 
access sectors that are otherwise not open to them. 
Thus, the key benefit to investors is the ability of 
securitization to tailor risk-return profiles. This idea 
is corroborated by Jobst (2006a), who states that 
‘investors of securitized debt can quickly adjust 
their investment holdings at low transaction costs in 
response to a change of personal risk sensitivity, 
market sentiment or consumption preferences’.  
Despite all of the above-mentioned advantages, 
securitization also has problems. Asset 
securitization transactions are fairly complex and 
involve a significant amount of due diligence, 
negotiation, and legal procedures. Consequently, it 
is more costly to implement than traditional 
corporate financing. This idea is corroborated by 
Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010), who point out that 
the disadvantages of securitization include the fixed 
costs of setting up the SPV and the potential 
reduction in the flow of tax benefits from keeping 
the assets on the balance sheet and financing them 
with debt. Similarly, Jobst (2006a) argues that the 
structural complexity as the root of the major 
concerns about this type of structured finance: (1) high 
accumulation of interest rate risks; (2) the potential for 
errors in the rating and pricing of complex security 
designs; and (3) the shortcomings of analytical models 
for assessing risks. 
Additionally, the credit crisis of 2007-2008 has 
somewhat tarnished the good image prevailing of 
the positive role played by securitization in 
dispersing credit risk, thereby enhancing the 
resilience of the financial system to default by 
borrowers. By linking singular credit facilities to the 
aggregate pricing and valuation discipline of capital 
markets, securitization was expected to help remedy 
deficiencies in financial markets arising from 
incomplete capital allocation. However, the collapse 
of the securitization market and the ensuing market 
turbulence have cast serious doubt on this economic 
proposition of unbundling, transforming, and 
redistributing credit risk via securitization 
instruments (Borio, 2008; IMF, 2008b; Benmelech 
and Dlugosz, 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009; Shin, 
2009; Keys et al., 2010; Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2011; Purnanandam, 2011).  
The literature highlights the following problems 
related to securitization, which are essentially 
mentioned within the context of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis: (1) complexity (Davidson et al., 
2003; Caselli and Gatti, 2005; Fender and Mitchell, 
2005; Fabozzi et al., 2006; Jobst, 2006a); (2) off-
balance sheet treatment (Fabozzi et al., 2006; and 
Rutledge and Raynes, 2010); (3) asymmetric 
information (Gorton, 2009; Jobst, 2009; Lupica, 
2009; Keys et al., 2010; Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2011; Krebsz, 2011; Purnanandam, 2011); 
(4) agency problems (Jobst, 2006a; Fabozzi and 
Kothari, 2007; Jobst, 2009; Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert, 2011; Purnanandam, 2011); and (5) higher 
transaction costs (Davidson et al., 2003; Cardone-
Riportella et al., 2010). 
4. Securitization and the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis was triggered by the 
exposure of financial institutions to the subprime 
mortgage market and related financial instruments, 
which were primarily associated to securitization. 
As the IMF (2008a) states ‘the proliferation of new 
complex structured finance products, markets, and 
business models exposed the financial system to a 
funding disruption and breakdown in confidence’ 
and that particular products ‘exacerbated the depth 
and duration of the crisis by adding uncertainty 
relating to their valuation as the underlying 
fundamentals deteriorated.’  
Two major problems can be pointed out underlying 
the financial crisis: (1) asymmetric information 
problems, and (2) agency problems. Several authors 
(Jobst, 2006a; Fabozzi and Kothari, 2007; Jobst, 
2009) argue that securitization may lead to a severe 
principal-agent problem when the originator retains 
little or no interest in the pool of securitized assets. 
In this case, the originator does not have the same 
incentive to pay attention to the creditworthiness of 
its customers, as would be the case when the assets 
remain on its balance sheet.  
Referring to asymmetric information, Gorton (2009) 
and Jobst (2009) argue that the loss of information 
when high complex structures are used to implement a 
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securitization transaction is a critical problem. When 
facing asymmetric information, originators and issuers 
might be tempted to pursue their own economic 
incentives, imposing a substantial agency cost on 
efficient asset securitization. Asymmetric 
information problems can come from (1) the 
information advantage of the originator with respect 
to the quality of borrowers and the historical 
performance of individual asset exposures – adverse 
selection; and (2) the complex security design of 
securitized assets, which suggests the superior 
information of arrangers concerning the true valuation 
of issued securities. Empirically, Downing et al. 
(2009), based on a dataset of MBS issued between 
1991 and 2002, found that informed originators trade 
lemons in the mortgage market; i.e., the assets sold to 
the SPV are of lower quality compared to the ones 
retained on the balance sheet. This idea is also 
corroborated by Carey (1998), Mian and Sufi (2009), 
Calem et al. (2010), Keys et al. (2010), Titman and 
Tsyplakov (2010), Krainer and Laderman (2011), and 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012), which argue that banks tend 
to retain higher quality assets14. 
In short, the crisis demonstrated that, in 
securitization, the value of the underlying cash 
flows varies with their repackaging, and that 
repackaging does not just eliminate risk. 
Additionally, when market deterioration becomes 
systemic, SPVs may be unable to withstand market 
inertia, and triggers will eventually be breached. 
Despite the weakness of the securitization process – 
credit risk transfer techniques undermine financial 
stability and emphasize the misalignment of 
incentives (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Parlour 
and Plantin, 2008) and securitization went in hand 
in hand with a decline in credit standards (Mian and 
Sufi, 2009; Keys et al., 2010; Dell’Ariccia et al., 
2012) – policymakers and market practitioners 
acknowledge its benefits and are overcoming 
securitization transaction shortcomings, by 
introducing changes in terms of standardization, 
transparency, and simplicity (e.g., US’s Dodd-Frank 
Act, Financial Accounting Standards Board 
amendments – FAS 166 and 167 –, and the joint 
work between the BoE and the ECB identifying the 
impediments that may be preventing the emergence 
of a healthy securitization market in Europe and 
suggesting policy options aimed at mitigating them). 
5. The securitization market 
5.1. Introduction. According to Tasca and Zambelli 
(2005), ‘the concept of asset securitization was 
introduced in the US financial system in the 1970s, 
                                                     
14 However, these results are contrary to the arguments presented by Kohen 
and Santomero (1980), Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), Kim and Santomero 
(1988), Flannery (1989), Blum (1999), Dionne and Harchaoui (2003), and 
Ambrose et al. (2005). They argue that banks could have an incentive to 
securitize lower risk assets and to retain risky assets. 
when the Government National Mortgage 
Association issued securities backed by a pool of 
loans, represented by residential mortgages.’ 
Afterwards, the securitization was applied to other 
assets such as credit card payments and auto loans 
receivables. It has also been employed as part of 
asset/liability management, in order to manage 
balance sheet risk for financial institutions.  
The first European transaction was also a RMBS, 
issued in the UK in 1987. The first countries to join 
the UK were Spain and France issuing ABS, in the 
early 1990s, followed by Finland, Sweden, Ireland, 
Italy, and Germany, in the mid-1990s. But only in 
the late 1990s securitization really began to take off 
as legislative changes in many countries began to 
simplify the process, allowing securitization to 
expand into other countries and asset classes. 
Finally, the introduction of the Euro in 1999 has 
significantly increased the importance of the 
European securitization market, leading to a rapid 
growth up until mid-2007. 
The diversity of the assets and the direct 
involvement of the public sector are characteristics 
differentiating the European market from the much 
larger and developed US market. While, in the US, 
the catalyst for securitization was the government’s 
objective for encouraging home ownership and 
creating a secondary market for mortgages, in 
Europe, there have been no government 
interventions with the goal of promoting 
securitization. In most European countries, larger 
commercial banks have issued the first MBS with 
the objectives of regulatory arbitrage, diversification 
of funding sources, and as a response to the appeal 
of international investors. A number of governments 
started to use securitization to reduce public budget 
deficits. Additionally, the lack of a large powerful 
body to provide homogenization and standards and 
the differing legal frameworks of each European 
government, provide a very different setting for 
securitization than in the US. 
In Europe, the legal setup of a deal is crucial, 
complicated, and is the main upfront cost for 
originators. There are three important areas to think 
about with respect to legislation: (1) type of law – 
Napoleonic (e.g., Belgium, Spain, France, 
Luxemburg, and Portugal), Anglo-Saxon (UK), or 
Germanic (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Austria, Netherlands, and Germany); (2) securing the 
assets and cash flows; and (3) local framework for 
securitization. Although we may refer to the 
European securitization market as a single market, it 
is in fact a collection of distinct markets (Adams, 
2005). The wide divergence in market sizes within 
Europe is a reflection of the very different 
economic, financial, political, historical, legal, and 
social frameworks. 
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5.2. Securitization in Western Europe. This 
section provides a statistical analysis of asset 
securitization (AS) in Western Europe15. We start by 
comparing the distribution of AS bonds across time, 
industry, and nationality of the issuer. The financial 
characteristics of ABS, MBS and CDO tranches are 
also presented and compared. Finally, we compare 
our results for Western Europe with securitization 
activity in Europe and the US.  
Information on AS bonds was extracted from DCM 
Analytics database. AS transactions typically consist 
of several tranches funding the same SPV. Therefore, 
we focus on the transaction tranches. DCM Analytics 
only provide information about AS securities issued in 
the capital markets through a public offering. We 
select bonds in the DCM Analytics database with the 
deal type code of “asset-backed security” and 
“mortgage-backed security”. Finally, we require that 
the issuer country belongs to Western Europe and that 
the tranche size be available. 
Table 1 shows the evolution of AS issues between 
2000 and 2011. AS peaked in 2008 (by value) and 
fell in 2009. After 2009, we do not have 
observations in our sample. This is partly explained 
by the European sovereign debt crisis, which has 
limited the increase of securitized products, but also 
by the fact that an increasing number of banks have 
underwritten their own securitization programs to 
use them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in 
the auctions of the ECB, issuing the so-called 
Covered Bonds. 
Table 1. Distribution of the sample of asset 
securitization bonds by year 
Year 
Asset securitization bonds 
Number of 
tranches 
Total value of tranches 
(€ Million) 
Percent of total 
value 
2000 115 26,027 14.5 
2001 81 12,990 7.3 
2002 77 17,709 9.9 
2003 42 14,894 8.3 
2004 66 31,555 17.6 
2005 53 10,034 5.6 
2006 55 10,639 5.9 
2007 35 3,469 1.9 
2008 39 36,122 20.2 
2009 36 15,694 8.8 
2010 - - - 
2011 - - - 
Total 599 179,132 100.0 
Table 2 shows that AS bonds (by value) are highly 
concentrated in the financial industry (75.1%). 
                                                     
15  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
Table 3 also shows clear differences between the 
Western European countries which attract AS 
transactions. AS bonds are highly concentrated in 
three countries (89.5% by value and 77% of the total 
number of issues are made by borrowers located in 
UK, Germany, and Italy), with the bulk number of 
issues concentrated in the UK (41.2% by value and 
48.7% of all AS tranches). 
Table 2. Industrial distribution of asset 
securitization bonds 










Commercial 90 21,750 12.1 
Industrial 33 11,622 6.5 
Utilities 27 8,522 4.8 
Financial institutions 444 134,457 75.1 
Transportation 5 2,785 1.6 
Government - - - 
Total 599 179,132 100.0 




Asset securitization bonds 
Number of 
tranches 





Austria 1 27 0.0 
Belgium 18 1,723 1.0 
Cyprus - - - 
Denmark - - - 
Finland - - - 
France 32 1,526 0.9 
Germany 117 42,299 26.4 
Greece 2 74 0.0 
Iceland - - - 
Ireland 10 3,309 1.8 
Italy 52 39,314 21.9 
Luxemburg 3 173 0.1 
Netherlands 42 4,270 2.4 
Norway - - - 
Portugal 11 1,391 0.8 
Spain 19 6,228 3.5 
Sweden - - - 
Switzerland - - - 
United Kingdom 292 73,797 41.2 
Total 599 179,132 100.0 
Table 4 examines and compares credit spread and 
contract characteristics among ABS, MBS and CDO 
tranches. Regarding the relative pricing of the three 
security classes, results show that the average credit 
spreads are economically and statistically higher for 
CDO tranches (206.1 bps) when compared to ABS 
(127.2 bps) and MBS (115.6 bps) tranches. On the 
contrary, average credit spreads for ABS and MBS 
tranches do not differ significantly at 1% 
significance level. 
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The average credit rating for ABS (4.1), MBS (3.9) 
and CDO (4.8) tranches do not differ significantly. 
This is interesting because contrary to the US where 
CDO collateral became dominated by lower level 
(BBB or A) of tranches recycled from other MBS 
whose assets were usually non-prime mortgages, in 
Western Europe CDO were generally diversified. 
Regarding country risk, only ABS issuers are, on 
average, located in riskier countries than in the case 
of CDO category. The average number of banks 
participating in a CDO transaction is 1.5 and is 
significantly smaller than the average for ABS (2.9) 
and for MBS (2.7). Similarly, CDO transactions have 
the lowest average number of bookrunners (1.1), 
which differ significantly from the average number of 
bookrunners in ABS (1.6) and MBS (1.5). 
CDO issues exhibit the lowest average tranche size 
of €92.8 million, less than the €362.5 million and 
€431.2 million average tranche size exhibited by 
ABS and MBS, respectively. Similarly, the average 
tranche size exhibited by ABS differs significantly 
at the 1% significance level from the average 
tranche size exhibited by MBS. 
Currency risk clearly suggests that ABS are often 
similar to MBS, but otherwise fundamentally 
different financial instruments from CDO. ABS in 
Western Europe are much less likely to be subject to 
currency risk (22.8% for ABS versus 14.2% and 
58.7% for MBS and CDO, respectively). While UK 
borrowers represent 57.3% of the ABS issues, they 
only account for 43.8% and 41.8% of the MBS and 
CDO issues, respectively. A significantly larger 
number of tranches per transaction are issued in a 
CDO transaction. In a typical CDO transaction, the 
average number of tranches per transaction is 5.7, 
which is larger than the average for ABS (3.6) and 
MBS (4.3). The average loan to value ratio – the 
ratio of the tranche size to the transaction size – for 
MBS (33.7%) and CDO (28.3%) is significantly 
lower than the loan to value ratio for ABS (44.3%). 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for ABS, MBS and CDO 
Variable of interest 
Security class 
Variable of interest 
Security class 
ABS MBS CDO ABS MBS CDO 
Univariate analysis − continuous variables 
Credit spread (bps) Number of tranches 
Number 176 124 139 Number 246 169 184 
Mean 127.2b 115.6c 206.1b,c Mean 3.6a,b 4.3a,c 5.7b,c 
Min. -220.4 -77.9 -50.6 Min. 1 1 1 
Max. 842.2 565.9 1,098.9 Max. 11 8 12 
Std. dev. 170.5 96.1 197.5 Std. dev. 2.5 1.9 3.0 
Credit rating [1-22 weak] Number of bookrunners 
Number 213 126 158 Number 246 169 184 
Mean 4.1 3.9 4.8 Mean 1.6b 1.5c 1.1b,c 
Min. 1 1 1 Min. 1 1 1 
Max. 15 12 17 Max. 5 4 4 
Std. dev. 3.4 3.3 3.9 Std. dev. 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Loan to value (%) Number of banks 
Number 246 169 184 Number 246 169 184 
Mean 44.3%a,b 33.7%a 28.3%b Mean 2.9b 2.7c 1.5b,c 
Min. 1.20% 0.01% 0.01% Min. 1 1 1 
Max. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Max. 14 8 6 
Std. dev. 36.9% 35.6% 31.5% Std. dev. 2.2 1.7 1.1 
Time to maturity (years) Country risk [1-22 weak] 
Number 246 169 184 Number 246 169 184 
Mean 17.0a 30.3a,c 17.7c Mean 1.5b 1.3 1.1b 
Min. 0.22 0.99 0.57 Min. 1 1 1 
Max. 48.0 57.4 85.9 Max. 6 5 3 
Std. dev. 11.4 14.3 15.4 Std. dev. 1.1 0.9 0.4 
Tranche size (€ Million) Transaction size (€ Million) 
Number 246 169 184 Number 246 169 184 
Mean 362.5a,b 431.2a,c 92.8b,c Mean 1,009.6a,b 1,036.3a,c 417.2b,c 
Min. 1.00 0.05 0.14 Min. 1.0 0.1 0.9 
Max. 5,000.0 22,298.0 1,142.5 Max. 5,000.0 27,728.0 2,250.0 
Std. dev. 629.2 1,844.4 163.5 Std. dev. 1,006.2 3,073.0 366.1 
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Table 4 (cont.). Descriptive statistics for ABS, MBS and CDO 
Variable of interest 
Security class 
Variable of interest 
Security class 
ABS MBS CDO ABS MBS CDO 
Univariate analysis − dummy variables 
Floating rate issue Currency risk 
N. of issues with data available 246 169 184 N. of issues with data available 246 169 184 
N. of issues with dummy = 1 150a,b 146a 154b N. of issues with dummy = 1 56b 24c 108b,c 
% of total available data 61.0% 86.4% 83.7% % of total available data 22.8% 14.2% 58.7% 
Financial institutions U.K. borrowers 
N. of issues with data available 246 169 184 N. of issues with data available 246 169 184 
N. of issues with dummy = 1 120a,b 150a 174b N. of issues with dummy = 1 141a,b 74a 77b 
% of total available data 48.8% 88.8% 94.6% % of total available data 57.3% 43.8% 41.8% 
Notes: ABS, MBS, and CDO mean asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations, 
respectively. The variables are as follows: Credit spread: spread at issue over comparable risk-free government security with a 
comparable maturity; Credit rating: S&P and Moody's rating at issuance – AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22; Loan 
to value: the ratio of the tranche size to the transaction size of a given bond; Time to maturity: maturity of bonds, in years; Number 
of tranches: the number of tranches for each transaction; Number of banks: the number of financial institutions participating in the 
bond issuance; Number of bookrunners: the number of financial institutions participating in the bond issuance as bookrunners; 
Country risk: S&P’s country credit rating at close – AAA=1, AA+=2, and so on until D=22. Floating rate issue: dummy equal to 1 if 
a bond is floating price and 0 otherwise; Currency risk: dummy equal to 1 for bonds that are denominated in a currency different 
from the currency in the deal’s nationality. The tests for similar distributions in contract characteristics across samples are the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for continuous variables and the Fisher’s exact test for dummy variables. a Indicate significant difference at 
the 1% level between ABS and MBS. b Indicate significant difference at the 1% level between ABS and CDO. c Indicate significant 
difference at the 1% level between MBS and CDO. 
An MBS tranche of average size matures over just 
30.3 years, which is a long period if we compare it 
with the average 17.0 and 17.7 years for ABS and 
CDO tranches, respectively. Finally, a significantly 
larger fraction of ABS tranches are fixed rate (39%) 
compared to the full sample of MBS (13.6%) and 
CDO (16.3%) tranches. 
Looking to the evolution of the structured finance 
markets, it is possible to conclude that securitization 
has become one of the most visible consequences of 
 
financial innovation in recent years (Table 5). 
According to the Association for Financial Markets, 
the volume of securitized assets in Western Europe 
grew from €78.2 billion in 2000 to €753.9 billion in 
2008. The 2007-2008 financial crisis, in which 
securitization seems to have played a determinant 
role, provoked a sharp change after the first quarter 
of 2008. In 2014, a total of €199.0 billion of 
securitized products were issued in Western Europe, 
a decline of 73.6% from 2008 (€753.9 billion). 
Table 5. Distribution of asset securitization bonds by year: Europe versus US 
Geographic location of issuer 
Total value (€ Bn) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Austria 0.60 - - - - - - - - 
Belgium 2.30 4.00 34.87 27.43 14.13 19.02 15.41 2.00 4.12 
Cyprus - - - - - - - - - 
Denmark - 0.50 - - 1.49 - - 0.80 0.03 
Finland - - - - - - - - - 
France 7.70 3.90 14.09 6.93 8.98 16.35 14.86 9.90 50.60 
Germany 37.70 18.50 110.61 18.36 13.39 12.91 10.03 22.60 18.43 
Greece 3.60 5.30 13.47 22.48 0.96 6.37 1.97 - 0.24 
Iceland - - - - - - - - - 
Ireland 10.70 10.40 35.97 25.13 6.55 - 1.22 1.00 2.07 
Italy 30.20 26.40 94.82 69.25 15.97 48.08 58.44 27.40 19.20 
Luxemburg - - - - - - - - - 
Netherlands 28.60 40.80 75.73 44.20 137.57 85.65 48.70 38.70 25.15 
Norway - - - - - - - - - 
Portugal 5.80 10.80 14.52 10.50 16.93 9.91 1.42 3.30 2.88 
Spain 44.00 61.10 103.40 64.88 54.92 61.72 18.63 27.50 27.19 
Sweden 0.20 - - - - - - - - 
Switzerland - - - - - - - - - 
United Kingdom 192.20 172.60 256.39 88.66 101.52 99.52 76.50 33.50 49.10 
Western Europe total 363.60 354.30 753.87 377.82 372.41 359.53 247.18 166.70 199.01 
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Table 5 (cont.). Distribution of asset securitization bonds by year: Europe versus US 
          
          
PanEurope 1.70 2.10 12.42 20.32 2.60 3.04 0.41 9.10 14.82 
Other Europe 1.90 1.10 12.91 1.82 1.63 3.38 2.95 4.70 1.93 
Multinational 3.70 96.20 39.42 23.65 0.74 6.02 0.49 0.40 0.19 
Europe in total 370.90 453.70 818.62 423.61 377.39 371.97 251.03 180.90 215.95 
U.S. total NA 2,404.90 933.63 1,358.90 1,276.69 1,013.72 1,550.18 1,508.87 1,070.34 
Note: Data according to the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, available at: http://www.afme.eu/reports.aspx. The 
difference between the values obtained from the AFM versus DCM Analytics database is due to the fact that the latter only contains 
AS transactions issued in the capital markets. 
As pointed out in Table 6 (see Appendix), MBS 
(RMBS and CMBS) continues to make up the 
majority of the issues carried out in Europe (€116.9 
billion in 2014), followed by ABS (€47.6 billion), 
SME loans (€33.3 billion), and Whole business 
securitization (€3.7 billion). In Q4 2014, €59.6 
billion (€56.4 billion Q4 2013) of securitized 
product was issued in Europe, an increase of 59.6% 
from Q3 2014 (€37.3 billion) but a decline of 40.1% 
from Q4 2012 (€99.5 billion). 
The volume of securitized assets in the US declined 
from €2,404.9 billion in 2007 to €933.6 billion in 
2008, a decline of 61.2%. In 2014, a total of 
€1.070.3 billion of securitized products were issued 
in the US, an increase of 14.6% from 2008. As for 
Europe, MBS (RMBS and CMBS) continues to 
make up the majority of the issues carried out 
(€818.2 billion in 2014), followed by ABS (€169.8 
billion), and CDO (€82.3 billion). The link between 
CDO and the 2007-2008 financial crisis is well 
demonstrated in Table 6. The weight of CDO in the 
total securitized assets in the US decreased from 
10.5% in 2007 to 4.3% and 0.11% in 2008 and 
2009, respectively. 
Conclusion 
Using a cross-section of 599 Western European 
asset securitization bonds closed during the 2000-
2011 period, we find that the average credit spread 
is economically and statistically higher for CDO 
when compared to ABS and MBS. Investors face 
higher deadweight transaction costs associated with 
principal-agent and asymmetric information 
problems when investing in a CDO vis-à-vis ABS 
and MBS, since CDO are more complex and the 
underlying pool of assets can be managed in terms 
of assets and cash flows. Considering the 
securitization instruments studied as a whole, we 
document important univariate differences, namely: 
(1) the average number of banks participating in a 
CDO transaction is significantly smaller than the 
average for ABS and for MBS; (2) CDO issues 
exhibit the lowest average tranche size of €92.8 
million, less than the €362.5 million and €431.2 
million average tranche size exhibited by ABS and 
MBS, respectively; (3) currency risk suggests that 
ABS are often similar to MBS, but otherwise 
fundamentally different financial instruments from 
CDO; (4) MBS tranches have much longer average 
maturity than ABS and CDO tranches; and (5) ABS 
tranches are more likely to be fixed rate rather than 
floating rate. 
The transition from the traditional originate-to-hold 
model to the originate-to-distribute model, as well 
as its reliance on credit markets as a continuing 
source of credit, has been blamed by academics and 
practitioners for the financial crisis of 2007-2008. If 
the originator does not hold the credit it originates, 
but distributes the loan and its risks to other entities 
through securitization, the originator has a reduced 
incentive to monitor the credit granting process. 
Thus, this model brings with it a major principal-
agent problem in the credit screening process, 
because the credit incentives of the originator are 
not aligned with those of the entity that ultimately 
holds the loan. When we add the complexity 
associated with the securitization process, the result 
is a ‘market for lemons’ problem (Akerlof, 1970), 
leading to the collapse of the market for securitized 
assets. 
However, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and 
the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis the 
ECB implemented several unconventional monetary 
policies to restore bank funding, enhancing the 
transmission of monetary policy and providing 
further monetary policy accommodation, like the 
more recently announced (September 2014) ABS 
purchase program16. This dual role of securitization 
raises two questions: (1) What is the impact of 
securitization on bank liquidity and funding costs? 
(2) What will the impact of the ECB ABS purchase 
programme be on the corporate cost of funding?16 
Answering these questions is an important avenue 
for further research. So far, the empirical literature 
                                                     
16  Additionally, the ECB implemented two Covered Bond Purchase 
Programs in 2009 and 2011 (CBPP1 and CBPP2), and more recently 
announced (September 2014) the third covered bond purchase program 
(CBPP3). See Beirne et al. (2011) for further details. 
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has devoted little attention to this issue. For example, 
Joyce et al. (2010) attempt to access the impact of 
Quantitative Easing Policy on asset prices, while 
Gagnon et al. (2010) conclude that the purchase of 
longer-term assets by the Federal Reserve since 2008 
was successful in reducing longer-term private 
borrowing rates and stimulating the economy. 
Regarding the Euro Area, Beirne et al. (2011) analyzed 
the impact of the first Covered Bond Purchase 
Program on bank funding conditions, with results 
showing that covered bonds yield in the euro area were 
reduced by approximately 12 bps. Further research 
could also explore how securitization changed the way 
banks manage their funding and liquidity and how 
these changes have in turn altered the traditional links 
between bank liquidity, cost of funds, and loan supply. 
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     Appendix 
Table 6. Distribution of asset securitization bonds by collateral: Europe versus US 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
€Bn % €Bn % €Bn % €Bn % €Bn % €Bn % €Bn % €Bn % 
Europe 
ABS 57.80 12.74% 73.02 8.92% 52.49 12.39% 31.40 8.32% 71.14 19.13% 52.47 20.90% 71.62 39.59% 47.63 22.06% 
CDO 88.65 19.54% 48.08 5.87% 107.14 25.29% 29.64 7.85% 9.24 2.48% 13.45 5.36% 9.25 5.11% 14.34 6.64% 
MBS 307.27 67.72% 697.52 85.21% 263.98 62.32% 272.19 72.12% 229.76 61.77% 137.82 54.90% 74.35 41.10% 116.93 54.15% 
SME - - - - - - 39.68 10.51% 59.59 16.02% 45.17 17.99% 20.24 11.19% 33.32 15.43% 
WBS/PFI - - - - - - 4.48 1.19% 2.24 0.60% 2.12 0.84% 5.44 3.01% 3.73 1.73% 
Total 453.72 100.00% 818.62 100.00% 423.61 100.00% 377.39 100.00% 371.97 100.00% 251.03 100.00% 180.90 100.00% 215.95 100.00% 
U.S. 
ABS 666.90 27.73% 88.72 9.50% 102.95 7.58% 82.63 6.47% 90.56 8.93% 153.51 9.90% 140.36 9.30% 169.79 15.86% 
CDO 252.50 10.50% 40.12 4.30% 1.56 0.11% 2.68 0.21% 7.73 0.76% 36.12 2.33% 60.80 4.03% 82.32 7.69% 
MBS 1,485.54 61.77% 804.79 86.20% 1,254.39 92.31% 1,191.38 93.32% 915.43 90.30% 1,360.55 87.77% 1,307.71 86.67% 818.23 76.45% 
Total 2,404.94  100.00% 933.63 100.00% 1,358.90 100.00% 1,276.69 100.00% 1,013.72 100.00% 1,550.18 100.00% 1,508.87 100.00% 1,070.34 100.00% 
Note: ABS: asset-backed securities; MBS: mortgage-backed securities; CDO: collateralized debt obligations; SME: small and medium enterprises; WBS/PFI: whole business securitizations/public 
finance initiatives. 
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